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JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (Supp. 1991).
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court correctly

conclude that, on the

record before it, the defendants were entitled to summary judgment?
Standard of Review: A trial court's grant of summary judgment
is reviewed under a "correctness" standard.

Daniels v. Deseret

Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n. 771 P.2d 1100, 1101-02 (Utah Ct. App.),
cert, denied,

781 P.2d

878

& 783

P.2d

53

(Utah

1989).

The

appellate court considers the evidence in the light most favorable
to the losing party and will affirm only where it appears that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material issues of fact or
where, even according to the facts as contended by the losing
party, the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.

Briggs v. Holcomb, 740 P.2d 281, 283 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).

Neither the trial court's conclusion that the facts are undisputed
nor its legal conclusions based on those facts are accorded any
deference.

Barlow Soc'y v. Commercial Sec. Bank, 723 P.2d 398, 399

(Utah 1986).
2.

Was there sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of

material fact as to whether the elevator in which the plaintiff was

- 1 -

injured was in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user?
Standard of Review:

In determining whether the trial court

properly found that there was no genuine issue of material fact,
the appellate court views the facts and inferences to be drawn
therefrom in the light most favorable to the losing party.

Utah

State Coalition of Senior Citizens v. Utah Power & Light Co., 776
P.2d 632, 634 (Utah 1989).
3.
material

Was there* sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of
fact as to whether the defendants had notice of the

dangerous condition of the elevators in the building at 185 South
State Street?
Standard of Review:

In determining whether a genuine issue of

material fact exists, the appellate court reviews the facts and the
inferences to be drawn from the facts in the light most favorable
to the losing party.
4.

Utah State Coalition, 776 P.2d at 634.

Did the trial court err in denying the plaintiff leave to

amend her complaint to add a claim based on the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur?
Standard of Review:

The decision to allow an amendment of a

pleading is discretionary with the trial court and will not be
disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion resulting in
prejudice to the appellant.
(Utah 1983).

Girard v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245, 248

An appellate court will find an abuse of discretion
- 2 -

if it is left with a definite and firm conviction, after reviewing
the whole record, that the trial court erred, Betz v. Chena Hot
Springs Group, 742 P.2d 1346, 1348 (Alaska 1987); if the trial
court's exercise of discretion is manifestly unreasonable or based
on untenable grounds or untenable reasons, Davis v. Globe Mach.
Mfg. Co., 684 P. 2d 692, 698 (Wash. 1984); or if the trial court
misapplied

or

ignored

recognized

legal principles

guiding

the

exercise of its discretion, Franklin v. Bartsas Realty, Inc., 598
P.2d 1147, 1149 (Nev. 1979); In re Estate of Kunzler, 707 P.2d 461,
465 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985).

The legal standard guiding the exercise

of a trial court's discretion in granting or denying leave to amend
is that leave to amend should be "freely given when justice so
requires."

Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a).

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONSf STATUTES OR RULES
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) is determinative of the
first three issues.

It provides, in relevant part:

The judgment sought shall be rendered
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. . . .
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) is determinative of the
fourth issue.

That rule provides, in relevant part:

A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of
course at any time before a responsive pleading is served
- 3 -

or, if the pleading is one to which no responsive
pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed
upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time
within 20 days after it is served. Otherwise a party may
amend his pleading only by leave of court or by written
consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely
given when justice so requires. . . .
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A,

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition in
the Court Below.
The plaintiff, Deanna Kleinert, brought this action to recover

damages

for

personal

injuries

she

sustained

in

an

elevator

designed, manufactured, installed and maintained by the defendants.
Record (lfR.!f) at la-6.

The plaintiff amended her complaint once

with leave of court to add additional defendants.
144-50.

The plaintiff then moved

id. at 136-37,

for leave to file a second

amended complaint to add a cause of action based on the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur.

Id. at 242-53.

While that motion was pending,

defendant Kimball Elevator Company moved for summary judgment on
the grounds that the plaintiff could not sustain her burden of
proving the allegations of her strict products liability claim.
Id. at 268.

The trial court granted Kimball's motion for summary

judgment and denied the plaintiff's motion for leave to file a
second amended complaint.

Id. at 377-78. The remaining defendants

then moved for summary judgment on the grounds that they had no
notice of any dangerous condition of the elevator,

- 4 -

id. at 381-93.

The

trial

court

granted

the

remaining

defendants' motion

for

summary judgment, id. at 424-25, and this appeal followed.
B.

Statement of Facts.
In 1984 the plaintiff worked as a legal secretary for a law

firm with offices in the building at 185 South State Street in Salt
Lake City.

R. at 341.

Defendants HRB Company, the Boyer Company,

185 South State Associates, Boyer-Gardner Properties Partnership,
H.

Roger

Boyer,

Kern C.

Gardner

and

185

South

Association owned and managed the building.1
Elevator

Company

manufactured,

elevators in the building.

installed

State

Owners7

Defendant Kimball
and

maintained

the

R. at 291, 328 & 467.

On April 16, 1984, at about 4:45 p.m., Ms. Kleinert left her
work station on the eighth floor of the building and went to the
sixth floor to take the mail and some documents to be photocopied.
She then got on an elevator to return to the eighth floor.
the only person on the elevator.

She was

The elevator doors closed, and

the lights inside the elevator went out. id. at 342. The elevator
was pitch dark except for lights above the doors that indicated the
floor.

Id. at 343-44.

Ms. Kleinert pressed the Open Door button,

but the doors would not open.
moved upward

several

Id. at 344-45.

floors and stopped

1

The elevator then

abruptly, causing the

For purposes of their motion for summary judgment, these
defendants did not dispute the plaintiff's assertion that they
owned or managed the common areas of the building, including the
elevators. R. at 387.
- 5 -

plaintiff to lose her balance,

id. at 345-46.

For the next forty

minutes or so, the plaintiff was trapped inside the elevator.

The

elevator would rise and stop, then fall and stop erratically.

Id.

at

345-50.

During

disoriented.

this

She tried

time

Ms. Kleinert

became

completely

to brace herself, but the

unexpected

movement of the elevator caused her to fall, striking her head,
arms and legs against the walls, doors and handrail inside the
elevator.

id. at 347-48.

She tried to use the emergency phone

inside the elevator, but it did not work, and, when the elevator
moved suddenly downward, she cut her hand on the edge of the phone
door.

id. at 348-49.

After about forty minutes, the elevator

stopped between the fifth and sixth floors.

Ms. Kleinert was able

to pry open the elevator doors enough to jump to the floor below.
Id. at 351-52.
Within minutes after escaping from the elevator, the plaintiff
reported the incident to her boss, David Hirschi.

id. at 441-42.

She was tousled, distraught and shaking, and she appeared to have
been crying.

id. at 442-43.

Ms. Kleinert told Mr. Hirschi that

she had been caught in the elevator, that it had dropped some
floors and that she had been jostled during the experience, id. at
443.
Ms. Kleinert made a claim for worker's compensation as a
result of the incident.

Her employer denied her claim, but an

administrative law judge found that the plaintiff had sustained
- 6 -

injuries as a result of a compensable industrial accident.

Id. at

360.
The plaintiff brought this action alleging that defendant
Kimball was strictly liable for the damages she suffered as a
result of her experience in the elevator because the elevator was
defective and unreasonably dangerous for its expected use.
146-47.

Id. at

She further alleged that the remaining defendants were

liable for failing to repair the elevator before the incident on
April 16, 1984, or for failing to warn business invitees, such as
the plaintiff, of the dangerous condition of the elevator.
147-48.

Id. at

The trial court denied her motion for leave to file a

second amended complaint to allege res ipsa loquitur and granted
the defendants7 motions for summary judgment. Id. at 377-78 & 42425.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The trial court erred

in granting the defendants

summary

judgment on the plaintiff's claims for strict products liability
and negligence.

The plaintiff introduced sufficient evidence from

which a jury could infer that the elevator in which she was injured
was in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user
(point I ) .

The plaintiff also produced sufficient evidence to

raise triable issues of fact as to whether the defendants knew or

- 7 -

should have known of the dangerous condition of the elevator and
whether they breached any duty they owed the plaintiff (point II).
The trial court also erred in denying the plaintiff leave to
amend her complaint to allege a claim based on res ipsa loquitur.
Leave to amend should be freely given in the interests of justice.
None of the grounds the defendants relied
plaintiff's

motion

for

plaintiff leave to amend.

leave

to

amend

on in opposing

justified

denying

the
the

(Point III.)
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF
COULD NOT SUPPORT HER PRODUCTS LIABILITY CLAIM AGAINST
KIMBALL ELEVATOR COMPANY.
The plaintiff's claim against Kimball Elevator Company was
based on the doctrine of strict products liability, which imposes
liability on "one who sells any product in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the user . . . ."

Restatement (Second)

of Torts § 402A (adopted in Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel
Co., 601 P. 2d 152, 158 (Utah 1979)).

Kimball moved for summary

judgment on the grounds that the plaintiff could not sustain her
burden of proving the allegations of her strict products liability
claim because she had not provided competent expert testimony to
prove a product defect.

R. at 268, 272.

The trial court agreed

and granted Kimball's motion for summary judgment.
- 8 -

Jd. at 376-78.

In doing so, the trial court ignored established Utah law governing
the grant of summary judgments and imposed a heavier burden on
products liability plaintiffs than is required under Utah law.
In reviewing the correctness of a trial court's grant of
summary judgment, the appellate court applies the same standard as
the trial court.

See Barlow Soc'y v. Commercial Sec. Bank, 723

P.2d 398, 399 (Utah 1986). The question is whether "the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law."

Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c).

Any

doubt or uncertainty concerning questions of fact must be resolved
in favor of the party opposing the motion, and all reasonable
inferences that can fairly be drawn from the evidence must be
evaluated in a light most favorable to the opposing party.

Bowen

v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434, 436 (Utah 1982).
Kimball claimed that the plaintiff had not raised a genuine
issue of fact as to whether or not the elevator in which she was
trapped was "in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user."

A defective condition is "a condition not contemplated by

the ultimate consumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous to
him." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A comment g. A defective
condition makes a product

"unreasonably

dangerous" if it is

dangerous "to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by
- 9 -

the ordinary consumer . . . , with the ordinary knowledge common to
the community as to its characteristics."

id. comment i.

The

plaintiff testified that she was trapped inside the elevator for
some forty minutes, that the lights inside the elevator went off,
that neither the doors nor the emergency telephone worked properly,
and that the elevator would rise, stop and fall errcitically and
abruptly, throwing her against the walls, doors and handrail.
Certainly one could reasonably infer from this evidence, evaluated
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, as the trial court
was required to evaluate it, that the elevator was in a defective
condition unreasonably dangerous to the user.

Users of elevators

do not contemplate that an elevator will act as the elevator in
this case did.
elevator
Because

and
the

They do not expect to be trapped

thrown

against

plaintiff's

inside the

its walls, as the plaintiff was.

testimony

created

a genuine

issue

of

material fact as to whether or not the elevator was in a defective
condition unreasonably dangerous to the user, the trial court erred
in granting Kimball summary judgment.
Kimball

argued,

however,

and

the

trial

court

apparently

agreed, that, under Utah law, a plaintiff "must either prove the
alleged defect with competent expert testimony or be dismissed."
R. at 277. Kimball misstated a plaintiff's burden under Utah law.
"Rule 56(e) permits a proper summary judgment motion to be opposed
by any of the kinds of evidentiary material listed in Rule 56(c),
- 10 -

except the mere pleadings themselves . . . ."
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).2
expert testimony.

Celotex Corp. v.

Rule 56(c) does not require

Rather, it allows a party to show that there is

a genuine issue of material fact by deposition testimony (among
other ways).

As shown above, the plaintiff's deposition testimony

was enough to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
the elevator was "in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer.11

None of the law Kimball relied on below

required any more.
Kimball first argued that section 78-15-6 of the Utah Code
required expert testimony.

R. at 277-79.

That section states, in

relevant part:
In any action for damages for personal injury . . .
allegedly caused by a defect in a product:
(1) No product shall be considered to
have a defect or to be in a defective
condition, unless at the time the product was
sold by the manufacturer or other initial
seller, there was a defect or defective
condition in the product which made the
product unreasonably dangerous to the user or
consumer.

2

Celotex, of course, dealt with Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56, not the Utah rule.
However, Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 56 is substantially similar in all relevant respects to
the federal rule.
Accordingly, this court can look to federal
courts' interpretation of the federal rule when construing Utah
Rule of Civil Procedure 56. See Prowswoodf Inc. v. Mountain Fuel
Supply Co., 676 P.2d 952, 958 (Utah 1984).
- 11 -

(3)
There is a rebuttable presumption
that a product is free from any defect or
defective condition where the alleged defect
in the plans or designs for the product or the
methods and techniques of manufacturing,
inspecting and testing the product were in
conformity
with
government
standards
established for that industry which were in
existence at the time the plans or designs for
the product or the methods and techniques of
manufacturing, inspecting and testing the
product were adopted.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-6 (1987).
Section 78-15-6 was initially enacted in 1977 as part of the
Utah Product Liability Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-15-1 et seq.
(1977).

In Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp. , 717 P.2d

670 (Utah

1985), the court declared the entire act, including section 78-156, invalid since the act's statute of repose, section 78-15-3, was
unconstitutional and the remainder of the act was not severable.
See 717 P.2d at 686.

In 1989, after Ms. Kleinert's experience in

the elevator, the legislature reenacted an amended section 78-15-3,
without its unconstitutional statute of repose, and provided that
the act's other provisions were severable.

Since there was no

valid section 78-15-6 in 1984, when the plaintiff was injured,
section 78-15-6 arguably does not apply in this case.

But even if

it did apply, it does not require a plaintiff to prove a product
defect by expert testimony.
Section 78-15-6 merely requires the plaintiff to prove that
the product was in a defective condition when it was sold and

- 12 -

establishes a rebuttable presumption that the elevator was free
from

any

defect

government

or

defective

standards.

The

condition

statute

is

if

it

silent

conformed
as

to

how

plaintiff must prove a defect or overcome the presumption.

with
the

Nothing

in the statute says that the plaintiff must prove a defect by
expert testimony, as Kimball claimed.

Moreover, the effect of any

presumption was simply to place on the plaintiff the burden of
going forward with the evidence or of making a prima facie case.
Tuttle v. Pacific Intermountain Express Co. . 121 Utah 420, 242 P.2d
764, 769 (1952).

The plaintiff met this burden.

She introduced

evidence—namely her own deposition testimony—from which a jury
could

have

concluded

that

the

elevator

was

in

a

defective

condition, despite any compliance with government standards. Under
these circumstances, any presumption disappeared, id., and it was
for the jury to determine whether the plaintiff's evidence was
sufficient to prove a product defect.
Kimball

also

argued

that

Utah

testimony in a case such as this.

case

law

required

expert

For this argument, Kimball

relied on Dowland v. Lyman Products for Shooters, 642 P.2d 380
(Utah 1982), and Reeves v. Geigy Pharmaceutical, Inc., 764 P.2d 636
(Utah Ct. App. 1988).
In Dowland, the court affirmed a jury verdict in favor of the
defendants on a strict products liability claim.

The only issue on

appeal was whether the trial court should have excluded testimony
- 13 -

by one of the defendant's expert witnesses. 642 P. 2d at 380 & 381.
The court held that, even if the trial court erred in admitting the
testimony, the error was harmless because the other evidence in the
case provided the jury with a substantial basis for concluding that
the product did not contain an unreasonably dangerous defect. Id.
at 381-82. The plaintiff in Dowland produced four expert witnesses
and still lost.

But the fact that expert testimony may not be

enough to convince a jury in a particular case does not mean that
expert testimony

is always required.

If Dowland stands for

anything, it is that the issue of product defect is ordinarily for
the jury to decide.
Similarly, Reeves does not require expert testimony to prove
a product defect.

Reeves brought the action after he suffered

severe injuries allegedly as a result of taking certain drugs
manufactured by the defendants.

The trial court granted the

defendants' motions for summary judgment on the grounds that, among
other things, there was a lack of evidence of causation.

On

appeal, the court held that there was sufficient evidence in the
record, even without opposing affidavits, to raise a genuine issue
of material fact as to whether Reeves' injuries were caused by the
drugs.

In the process, the court held that expert medical

testimony was required to establish causation because whether or
not the defendants' product could have caused Reeves' injuries was
a matter "outside the knowledge and experience of lay people." 764
- 14 -

P.2d at 640.
is whether

Causation is not the issue in this case.
or not the

elevator

was

unreasonably dangerous to the user.

in a defective

The issue
condition

That is a matter well within

the knowledge and experience of lay people.
jurors, are the average users of elevators

Lay people, such as
and

therefore

are

especially well qualified to decide whether an elevator that acted
as the plaintiff claimed the elevator in this case acted can be
considered to be in a defective condition, that is, whether it was
in "a condition not contemplated by the ultimate" user that made it
dangerous "to an extent beyond that contemplated by the ordinary"
user.

See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A & comments g & i_.

Thus, expert testimony was not required.

Cf_. Nixdorf v. Hicken.

612 P.2d 348, 352 (Utah 1980) (expert testimony was not necessary
to show that a doctor who left a needle in a patient was negligent
since "the propriety of the treatment received is within the common
knowledge and experience of the layman").
If Reeves is relevant to this case at all, it is because it
recognized that summary judgment should not be loosely granted: "In
considering a motion for summary judgment, it is not appropriate
for a court to weigh the evidence or assess the credibility" of
witnesses.

764 P.2d at 639.

"[I]t only takes one sworn statement

to dispute the averments on the other side of the controversy and
create

[a genuine issue of material fact]."

Id. at 640.

The

plaintiff's deposition testimony in this case was just such a sworn
- 15 -

statement, which raised genuine issues of material fact precluding
summary judgment.
Cases from other jurisdiction support the plaintiff's position
that expert testimony was not required for her to get to a jury.
In Power v. Otis Elevator Company, 409 So.2d 389 (La. Ct. App.
1982), the plaintiff had fallen down an escalator.

She claimed

that the escalator had jerked violently, causing her to fall.

Her

evidence at trial consisted of her own testimony and that of two
witnesses.

409 So.2d at 390.

The defendant presented testimony

from its own mechanics, who testified that there had never been any
trouble with the

escalator

before

and that the escalator

was

constructed in such a way that it would stop if the current were
interrupted.

The defendant also presented the testimony of an

escalator engineer who stated that, in his opinion, it was not
possible for the escalator to move as the plaintiff claimed it did.
The court held:
The jury heard all this testimony and necessarily
concluded that the escalator did not malfunction and that
the plaintiff's fall was more probably due to her failure
to take adequate precautions as she rode the escalator.
. . . [P]laintiff's evidence was not compelling and the
jury had a sufficiency of evidence before it to conclude
that the plaintiff did not prove her case of a defect in
the escalator.
For us to reverse would constitute an
invasion of the fact finding function of the jury.
Id. at 391.

Although the plaintiff

lost in Power, the court

recognized that where, as here, the evidence of a malfunction is
disputed, it is for the jury to decide whether there was a defect
- 16 -

in the machine.

In fact, some courts have held that expert opinion

testimony that a product was defective or unreasonably dangerous is
inadmissible because it invades the province of the jury.
e.g. , Willoughby v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 198 F.2d

See,

604, 605-06

(D.C. Cir. 1952); Aller v. Rodaers Mach. Mfg. Co.. 268 N.W.2d 830,
840 (Iowa 1978).

By taking the issue of product defect away from

the jury, the trial court in this case invaded "the fact finding
function of the jury."
Finally,

Kimball

Cf. Power, 409 So.2d at 391.
argued

below

that

the

public

policy

underlying products liability in Utah mandated dismissal of the
plaintiff's claim.

Just the opposite is true.

When Utah first adopted strict products liability, it did so
"to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective
products

[would be] borne by the manufacturers

that put such

products on the market rather than by the injured persons who are
powerless to protect themselves."

Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco

Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152, 156 (Utah 1979) (quoting Greenman v. Yuba
Power Prods. . Inc.r 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1962)).

The court

noted that strict products liability was created "because of the
economic and social need for the protection of consumers in an
increasingly complex and mechanized society, and because of the
limitations in the negligence and warranty remedies."

Id. at 157

(quoting Daly v. General Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162, 1166 (1978)).
In other words, strict products liability was meant to protect
- 17 -

consumers and other users of products, like the plaintiff, not
manufacturers, like Kimball.
In striking down the former Utah Product Liability Act, the
Utah Supreme Court held that the act's statute of repose violated
the open

court's

clause of the Utah Constitution, article

I,

section 11, which provides that "every person, for an injury done
to him . . ., shall have remedy by due course of law . . . ."

See

Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 683 (Utah 1985).

It

is that very right that the trial court's ruling deprived the
plaintiff of.

If a plaintiff were required to prove a product

defect by expert testimony in every case, as Kimball argued and the
trial

court

apparently

agreed, product manufacturers

insulated from liability in many cases.
"an

increasingly

complex

machines

complex
that we

be

It was because we live in

and mechanized
only

would

partially

society,"

filled

understand,

doctrine of strict products liability developed.
P.2d at 157 (quoting Daly, 575 P.2d at 1166).

that

with
the

See Hahn, 601

The trial court's

ruling harks back to the time when a manufacturer could place
defective products on the market with impunity because it was too
difficult for the plaintiff to prove that the manufacturer was
negligent.

The law has come a long way since that time.

Current

Utah law did not require the plaintiff to establish a product
defect by expert testimony.

It was for the jury to decide whether

the plaintiff's testimony was sufficient to meet her burden of
- 18 -

establishing a product defect. The trial court erred by taking the
plaintiffs case against Kimball away from the jury.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THERE WAS NOT A
GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT AS TO WHETHER THE
DEFENDANTS HAD SUFFICIENT NOTICE OF THE DANGEROUS
CONDITION OF THE ELEVATORS.
The remaining defendants, HRB Company, Boyer Company, 185
South State Associates, Boyer-Gardner Properties Partnership, H.
Roger

Boyer,

Kern

C.

Gardner

and

185

South

State

Owners'

Association,3 moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the
plaintiff had no evidence to show that the defendants had notice of
the alleged dangerous condition of the elevators in the building at
185

South

State

and

thus

had

no duty

to repair

or warn

the

plaintiff of the dangerous condition.
The Utah Supreme Court has never considered the degree of care
that the owner or operator of an automatic passenger elevator owes
to a passenger, but most courts that have considered the issue have
held

the

owner

or

operator

of

an

elevator

standards of care as a common carrier.

to

the

same

high

See, e.g. , Cash v. Otis

Elevator Co. . 684 P.2d 1041, 1043 (Mont. 1984); Smith v. Munaerr
532 P.2d 1202, 1204-05 (Okla. Ct. App. 1974), cert, denied (1975).
Under Utah

law, although

a carrier

3

is not an insurer of

its

For convenience, the remaining defendants will be referred
to collectively as "the defendants."
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passengers7 safety, it must exercise the utmost care to protect its
passengers against accidents.

See McMaster v. Salt Lake Transp.

Co., 108 Utah 207, 159 P.2d 121, 122 (1945); Christensen v. Oregon
Short Line R.R. Co. , 35 Utah 137, 148, 99 P. 676 (1909).
Because of the greater duty the owner of an elevator owes its
passengers,

some

courts

have

held

that,

where,

as

here,

a

passenger, through no fault of her own, is injured when an elevator
malfunctions and the occurrence cannot be accounted for without
negligence, she has presented sufficient evidence, not only to get
by summary judgment, but also to sustain a verdict in her favor.
See, e.g., Chapman v. Turnbull Elevator, Inc., 158 S.E.2d 438, 440
(Ga. Ct. App. 1967); Koenia v. 399 Corp., 240 N.E.2d 164, 166-67
(111. Ct. App. 1968).
At a minimum, the defendants, as property owners,4 owed the
plaintiff a duty to use reasonable care to make conditions in the
building reasonably safe for her. Williams v. Melby, 699 P. 2d 723,
726, 727 (Utah 1985).

"The care to be exercised in any particular

case depends upon the circumstances of that case and on the extent
of foreseeable danger involved and must be determined as a question
of fact."

Id. at 727 (quoting DCR, Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co., 663

P.2d 433, 435 (Utah 1983)).

If a reasonably prudent person should

4

For purposes of their motion for summary judgment, the
defendants conceded that they were the owners and managers of the
common areas of the building at 185 South State, including the
elevators. R. at 387.
- 20 -

have known or, by the exercise of reasonable care, could have
learned that the elevators constituted a dangerous condition, the
defendants
precautions.

can

be

liable

for

not

taking

adequate

safety

See id. at 728.

The plaintiff presented sufficient facts from which a jury
could conclude that a reasonably prudent person should have known
or could have learned, by the exercise of reasonable care, that the
elevators constituted a dangerous condition and should have taken
adequate precautions to prevent someone like the plaintiff from
being injured in one of the elevators:5
Between January 1, 1983, and April 16, 1984, Kimball employees
responded to forty-nine "trouble calls11 regarding the elevators at
185 South State, fourteen of which involved persons stuck in the
elevators.

See R. at 400 f 17.

The plaintiff herself had been stuck in the elevators at 185
South State three or four times before the incident on April 16,
1984.

On

those

occasions,

she

had

notified

her

employer's

personnel manager about the problems, and the personnel manager had
indicated that she would contact defendant Boyer Company.

See id.

at 399 ff 10-11.

5

These facts were set out in the plaintiff's memorandum in
opposition to the defendants7 motion for summary judgment. See R.
at 396 f 7, 397 f 13, 399-401 ff 10-20. In their reply memorandum,
the defendants did not dispute these facts, although they did
dispute their significance. See R. at 413-15.
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The property manager for the Boyer Company testified that he
would be notified of elevator stoppages either by a tenant in the
building or by Kimball.

See id. at 399-400 f 12.

The property manager for the Boyer Company further testified
that he had notice of the elevators breaking down, not working,
stopping and catching people inside and not responding to calls or
going to the wrong floor.

See id. at 396 f 7.

The elevators at

185 South State caused him special concern because they had "a
higher incidence of elevator malfunctions" than the elevators at
other properties he had managed.

See id. at 401 f 19.

A Kimball employee testified that he could "document several
cases" where people had started an elevator rocking and "trip[ped]
it electrically," causing it to go up and down.

See R« at 397 f 13

& 333. He further testified that there had been a "common problem"
with the elevators at 185 South State in that people would open the
panels inside the elevators so that they could bypass switches and
get into the workings of the computer that regulated the elevators.
It became "such a problem" that Kimball had to put special locks on
the panels.

See id. at 397 f 13, 401 f 18 & 335.

It was a common joke among those who worked in the building
that the elevators were always getting

stuck.

Lights

in the

elevators had gone out on other occasions. The plaintiff testified
that no one paid much attention to the elevator alarms because
"they go off all the time."

See id. at 400 ff 13-15.
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The plaintiff's boss testified that, before the accident, he
had heard talk around the office that the elevators were not
working properly, that the lights would not come on and that the
elevators would not stop at a floor.

He further testified that

people in the building "were generally aware . . . that there was
a potential problem" with elevators dropping one or more floors,
but he could not say whether they were aware of the potential
problem before or after the plaintiff's accident.

See id. at 400

f 16, 443-44 & 461.
From all this evidence a jury could reasonably conclude that
the defendants had notice of the dangerous condition of the
elevator. Cf. Jones v. Otis Elevator Co., 861 F.2d 655, 662 (11th
Cir. 1988) (evidence of substantially similar incidents eighteen
months before was sufficient for the

jury to infer notice).

Although the defendants may not have previously known the elevator
that injured the plaintiff to act precisely as it did in this case,
they were

on notice

complained of.

of many

of the problems

the plaintiff

They knew or should have known of lights in the

elevators going out.

They knew or should have known that the

elevators had a tendency to drop floors and not stop at a floor.
They certainly knew that people were frequently stuck in the
elevators.

And they should have foreseen that a person stuck in

the elevator might get injured if the elevator moved suddenly. One
could reasonably conclude from all the evidence, taken as a whole,
- 23 -

that the defendants should have reasonably anticipated that one of
their

elevators

would

malfunction,

injuring

the

plaintiff.

This is especially true if Utah were to follow "the best
reasoned authorities and a majority of them," Smith v. Munger. 532
P.2d at 1205 (guoting Lander v. Hornbeck, 179 P. 21 (Okla. 1918)),
which hold an elevator owner to the same high standard as a common
carrier.

A carrier "is bound to a much longer forecast of the

dangers which surround
strangers."

[its passengers] than he is as regards

Giger v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 60 F.2d 63, 64 (2d

Cir. 1932) (per L. Hand, J.),

quoted with approval in Johnson v.

Lewis, 121 Utah 218, 240 P.2d

498, 502

(1952).

A carrier is

required to exercise "the 'highest human foresight' possible in the
circumstances."

id. (citation omitted).

In a case such as this,

the court is "not therefore to measure what the defeadant should
have foreseen by ordinary standards; the law imposes on him a
meticulous regard for possibilities which should ordinarily be
ignored."

Id.

The defendants argued below that they had fulfilled whatever
duty they had by contracting for regular inspection and maintenance
of the elevators. The Eleventh Circuit rejected a similar argument
in Jones v. Otis Elevator Co.. 861 F.2d 655 (11th Cir. 1988).

The

court held that the plaintiff's testimony about how the elevator
operated, as well as her expert's testimony, although disputed, was
sufficient to establish the defendant's negligence in maintaining
- 24 -

the elevator and that it was for the jury to weigh the conflicting
evidence and inferences.
Devonshire

Hall

(evidence

that

Apts.,
the

861 F.2d at 663.
420

owner

A.2d

514,

provided

for

See also McGowan v.

519

(Pa.

regular

Super.

1980)

inspection

and

service of the elevator and that inspections immediately before and
after the accident showed no defect did not justify taking the case
from the jury; the jury was free to conclude that the owner had not
provided for sufficiently thorough or frequent inspections).

An

elevator owner has a nondelegable duty to provide for the safety of
its passengers.

See, e.g., Phegley v. Graham, 215 S.W.2d 499, 503-

04 (Mo. 1948).

The defendants cannot escape liability simply by

showing that they contracted with Kimball to service the elevators.
See, e.g. , Cash v. Otis Elevator Co. , 684 P.2d 1041, 1045-46 (Mont.
1984); Buford v. Chicago Housing Auth., 476 N.E.2d 427, 436 (111.
App. Ct. 1985) (housing authority could be liable even though an
elevator

mechanic

checked

the

elevator

the

day

before

the

accident).
"Summary

judgment should be granted with great caution in

negligence cases."

Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723, 725 (Utah

1985) (citations omitted).
care to discover

Whether the defendants used reasonable

and correct

any defect was

determine.
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for the

jury to

III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE PLAINTIFF LEAVE
TO AMEND TO ADD A CLAIM FOR RES IPSA LOQUITUR.
The plaintiff moved to amend her complaint to add a claim
based on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.

Kimball opposed her

motion on the grounds that res ipsa loquitur cannot apply in a
strict products

liability

action.

R. at 269.

The

remaining

defendants opposed the plaintiff's motion on timeliness grounds.
Id. at 256-58.

The trial court denied the motion.

Because the

basis for the trial court's ruling is not clear, see icl. at 484-87,
the plaintiff will address both grounds for opposing the motion.
Kimball argued that, where a plaintiff specifically relies on
a theory of strict products liability, she may not rely on res ipsa
loquitur but must prove the existence of a product defect by expert
testimony.

Id. at

285-86.

As

shown

in part

I, supra, the

plaintiff was not required to prove her strict products liability
claim

by

expert

testimony.

But regardless

of whether

expert

testimony is required in a strict products liability action, the
plaintiff was still entitled to rely on res ipsa loquitur.
A careful reading of the plaintiff's proposed Second Amended
Complaint shows that the plaintiff was not trying to assert res
ipsa loquitur to prove her strict products liability claim against
Kimball.

Instead, she wanted to assert a separate claim, based on

res ipsa loquitur, against all the defendants.
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See R. at 250

(Third Claim for Relief).

Utah law expressly allows a party to

plead claims for relief in the alternative.

See Utah R. Civ. P.

8(a); Rosander v. Larsen, 14 Utah 2d 1, 376 P.2d 146, 146 (1962).
To get to a jury on a claim of res ipsa loquitur, the plaintiff
only had to show that

(1) the accident was of a kind that

ordinarily would not have happened had the defendants used due
care, (2) the instrument or thing causing the injury was at the
time of the accident under the management and control of the
defendants, and (3) that the accident happened irrespective of any
fault on the part of the plaintiff. Dalley v. Utah Valley Regional
Medical Center. 791 P.2d 193, 196 (Utah 1990) (citing Moore v.
James, 5 Utah 2d 91, 96, 297 P.2d 221, 224 (1956)).

To state a

claim based on res ipsa loquitur, the plaintiff was not required to
allege, much less prove, a product defect—by expert testimony or
otherwise.
Kimball tried to use the plaintiff's alternative theories of
recovery to suggest that, if the plaintiff was hurt by a product
defect, then something other than the defendants7 negligence could
have caused the accident, which means that the accident was not of
a type that ordinarily would not have happened except for someone's
negligence. See R. at 285-86. The argument ignores rule 8, which
expressly allows a plaintiff to plead inconsistent claims.
Utah R. Civ. P. 8(e)(2).

See

Moreover, the argument misperceives the

doctrine of strict products liability. Just because the plaintiff
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may have been injured by a defective product does not mean that the
defendant was not negligent.

Many product defects are the result

of someone's negligence, in designing, manufacturing, testing or
maintaining the product. The doctrine of strict products liability
was only meant to relieve the plaintiff of the burden of proving
that

a defendant

was

negligent.

It

defendant was not in fact negligent.

does

not

mean

that

the

The defendant may or may not

have been negligent. The question is simply irrelevant to a strict
products liability claim.

Thus, the fact that the plaintiff may

have been injured by a defective product does not necessarily mean
that the accident was not of a type that ordinarily does not occur
in the absence of negligence.

It simply means that the plaintiff

did not have to prove negligence to recover, but she was still
entitled to allege negligence and to rely on res ipsa loquitur for
an

inference

of

negligence,

products liability claim.
either

strict

products

as

an

alternative

to

her

strict

Whether or not she could actually prove
liability

or the

elements

of res

ipsa

loquitur at trial was not for the trial court to decide from
disputed evidence and on a motion for leave to amend.
Other

courts,

under

similar

circumstances,

have

allowed

plaintiffs to proceed against elevator companies under theories of
both res ipsa loquitur and strict products liability.
Ruiz v. Otis Elevator, 703 P.2d
1985).

1247, 1249-51

See, e.g. ,

(Ariz. Ct. App.

Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court has allowed plaintiffs to
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rely on res ipsa loquitur in similar cases.

See, e.g., Sansone v.

J.C. Penney Co.. 17 Utah 2d 46, 404 P.2d 248, 249-50 (1965).

The

plaintiff in Sansone was injured while riding an escalator.

"Due

to the nature of an escalator it was impossible for the plaintiff
to know or to show just what caused her injury."

404 P.2d at 249.

The court held that, under the circumstances, the trial court
properly submitted the case to the jury on the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur, even though the plaintiff had placed "100% reliance" on
the defectiveness of the escalator.
dissenting).

See id. at 250 (Henriod, C.J. ,

The court stated:

It is common knowledge that escalators are widely
used in public buildings . . . and that thousands of
people . . . use them daily without injury.
It is
certainly not unreasonable for one to assume that it is
safe to use them in the manner and for the purpose for
which they were intended. Nor does it depart from reason
to draw the inference that if an escalator is so used and
an injury occurs there was something wrong in either the
construction, maintenance, or operation of the escalator.
404 P.2d at 249-50 (footnotes omitted).
What the court said of escalators in Sansone is equally true
of elevators. Thus, the plaintiff's allegations were sufficient to
state a claim under Utah law based on res ipsa loquitur.6
6

For other cases allowing the plaintiff to rely on res ipsa
loquitur under facts similar to those in Sansone or in this case,
see Londono v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 766 F.2d 569
(D.C. Cir. 1985); Simmons v. City Store Co. , 412 F.2d 897 (5th Cir.
1969) (applying Alabama law); Otis Elevator Co. v. Seale, 334 F.2d
928 (5th Cir. 1964) (applying Louisiana law); Otis Elevator Co. v.
Henderson, 514 A.2d 784 (D.C. 1986); Ferguson v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 408 So.2d 659, 660-61 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981), petition
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The remaining defendants opposed the plaintiff's motion for
leave to amend on the grounds that the motion was filed some six
and one-half years after the accident, two and ones-half years after
the action was filed, and after substantial discovery had been
completed.

They also complained that any new claims the plaintiff

sought to assert would be barred by the statute of limitations and
that the proposed amended complaint raised new issues of fact.
R. at 257.

See

These objections did not justify the trial court in

denying the plaintiff's motion for leave to amend any more than
Kimball's objection did.
Although the timeliness of a motion to amend is one factor
Utah courts consider in determining whether the motion should have
been granted, the cases in which motions to amend were held to have
been untimely have generally involved motions made on the eve of
trial.

See, e.g., Staker v. Huntington Cleveland Irrigation Co.,

664 P. 2d 1188, 1189-90 (Utah 1983) (motion made the day of trial);
Westley

v.

Farmer's

Ins. Exch. , 663

P.2d

93, 94

(Utah

1983)

(amendment "would certainly have delayed the trial"); Girard v.

denied, 418 So.2d 1281 (Fla. 1982); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v.
Street, 327 So.2d 113 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Otis Elevator Co.
v. Reid, 706 P.2d 1378, 1380 (Nev. 1985); Burgess v. Otis Elevator
Co., 495 N.Y.S.2d 376, 379 (App. Div. 1985), aff'd, 503 N.E.2d 692
(N.Y. 1986); Weeden v. Armor Elevator Co.. 468 N.Y.S.2d 898 (1983);
Mallor v. Wolk Properties, Inc., 311 N.Y.S.2d 141, 144 (1969);
Carney v. Otis Elevator Co., 536 A.2d 804, 807 (Pa. Super. 1988);
McGowan v. Devonshire Hall Apartments, 420 A.2d 514, 518-19 (Pa.
Super. 1980); Bond v. Otis Elevator Co., 388 S.W.2d 681 (Tex.
1965).
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Appleby, 660 P.2d 245, 248 (Utah 1983) (motion made the day of
trial); Hein's Turkey Hatcheries, Inc. v. Nephi Processing Plant,
Inc. , 24 Utah 2d 271, 470 P.2d 257, 257 (1970) (amended answer
presented for the first time at trial),* Chadwick v, Nielsen P 763
P. 2d 817, 820 (Utah Ct. App* 1988) (motion made the morning of
trial); Tripp v. Vaughn. 746 P.2d 794, 797-98 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)
(motion made two weeks before trial).

Where an amendment would not

delay trial, courts have generally allowed the amendment, even
where the amendment added an issue specifically excluded as a trial
issue by the pretrial order.

See, e.g. , Lewis v. Moultree, 627

P.2d 94, 97-98 (Utah 1981); Gillman v. Hansen, 26 Utah 2d 165, 486
P.2d 1045, 1046 (1971) ("The rule in this state has always been to
allow amendments freely where justice requires, and especially is
this

true

before

trial11)

(footnote

omitted).

The

primary

considerations in considering a motion to amend are whether the
parties have adequate notice to meet new issues and whether any
party receives an unfair advantage or disadvantage.

Rinqwood v.

Foreign Auto Works, Inc., 786 P.2d 1350, 1359-60 (Utah Ct. App.),
cert, denied, 795 P.2d

1138 (Utah 1990).

The timeliness of a

motion to amend is important only where one party is disadvantaged
by the motion, such as where the party does not have an adequate
opportunity to prepare its defense.
Here,

the

disadvantaged

defendants

would

if the plaintiff

not

had been
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have
allowed

been

unfairly

to amend

her

complaint to allege res ipsa loquitur.
set.

No trial date had yet been

In fact, discovery was still ongoing, and the proposed

amendment would not have necessitated much further discovery, if
any.

The only new issue raised by the proposed amendment that the

defendants

identified

was whether

the

elevator

was

under

the

exclusive control and management of the defendants, see R. at 257,
a matter clearly within their knowledge. Under such circumstances,
Utah courts freely allow amendments to the pleadings.

See, e.g.,

Thomas J. Peck & Sons, Inc. v. Lee Rock Prods., Inc., 30 Utah 2d
187, 515 P.2d 446, 449-50 (1973); Gillman, 486 P.2d at 1046, 1047;
Hancock v. Luke, 46 Utah 26, 35-38, 148 P. 452 (1915).
Moreover, the fact that the motion was made after the statute
of

limitations would

otherwise have run on the claim did not

justify denying the motion.

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)

expressly provides for the relation back of claims made in an
amended pleading.

Thus, amendments are generally allowed even

though, but for the right to amend, the statute of limitations
would have run. Meyers v. Interwest Corp. . 632 P. 2d 879, 882 (Utah
1981) .
Finally, the plaintiff could have relied on a theory of res
ipsa loquitur if the evidence at trial established the elements of
such a claim, even if she had not pled res ipsa loquitur.

See Loos

v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co. , 99 Utah 496, 108 P.2d 254, 258-59
(1940) (remanding to allow amendment of the pleadings to allege res
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ipsa loquitur where the evidence at trial supported application of
the doctrine but did not support the specific claims of negligence
alleged and on which a verdict for the plaintiff was based).

Thus,

the defendants could not have been prejudiced by an amendment to
allege res ipsa loquitur before trial.
Leave to amend a complaint must "be freely given when justice
so requires.11

Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a).

If the underlying facts or

circumstances the plaintiff relies on may be a proper subject of
relief, she ought to be given an opportunity to amend to test her
claim on the merits.

Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).

Although the grant or denial of leave to amend is within the trial
court's discretion, the trial court must justify its refusal to
permit an amendment.
Cir. 1976).
the trial

Id; Ondis v. Barrows, 538 F.2d 904, 909 (1st

None of the reasons the defendants asserted justified
court

in denying

the

plaintiff

leave

to amend

complaint to add a claim based on res ipsa loquitur.

her

Therefore,

the trial court abused its discretion in denying the plaintiff's
motion for leave to amend.
CONCLUSION
The plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to raise triable
issues of fact as to whether the elevator that injured her was in
a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user, whether
the defendants owed the plaintiff
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a duty of care and, if so,

whether they breached that duty.
in

granting

the

defendants'

The trial court therefore erred
motions

for

summary

judgment.

Moreover, the evidence was sufficient to allow a jury to infer
negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.

The trial

court abused its discretion in denying the plaintiff leave to amend
to assert such a claim.
defendants summary

The orders of the trial court granting the

judgment and denying the plaintiff

leave to

amend should therefore be reversed.
DATED this

3*h

day of May, 1992.
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